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Core Idea: Runtime Code Polymorphism
Definition
Regularly changing the behaviour of a (secured) component, at runtime, while
maintaining unchanged its functional properties
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Default cipher scheme (static) With runtime code polymorphism
Definition
Regularly changing the behaviour of a (secured) component, at runtime,
while maintaining unchanged its functional properties.
What for?
Protection against reverse engineering of SW
the secured code is not available before runtime
the secured code regularly changes its form (code generation interval ω > 1)
Protection against physical attacks
polymorphism changes the spatial and temporal properties of the secured code: side
channel & fault attacks
combine with usual SW protections against focused attacks
How?
deGoal: runtime code generation for embedded systems
fast code generation
tiny memory footprint: proof of concept on TI’s MSP430 (512 bytes of RAM)
Compilettes & deGoal in a Nutshell
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Aim
Modify kernel’s binary instructions
according to the input data
whenever needed at runtime
The deGoal framework builds compilettes
A compilette is:
an ad hoc code generator that targets one kernel
aimed to be invocated at runtime
Polymorphic Code Generation
deGoal runtime capabilities
Performed in this order:
1 register selection
2 instruction selection
3 instruction scheduling
Adaptation to achieve runtime code polymorphism:
Portability to very small processors and secure elements
Limited memory consumption
Fast runtime code generation
Ability to combine with hardware countermeasures
Introduce alea during runtime code generation [1,2,3]
Polymorphism:
random mapping to physical registers [1]
use of semantic equivalences [2]
instruction scheduling [3]
insertion of dummy operations [3]
Example: polymorphic AES
Polymorphic implementation of the
SubBytes function:
void gen_subBytes( cdg_insn_t* code
, uint8_t* sbox_addr
, uint8_t* state_addr)
{
#[
Begin code Prelude
Type uint32 int 32
Alloc uint32 state, sbox, i, x, y
mv state, #(state_addr)
mv sbox, #(sbox_addr)
mv i, #(0)
loop:
lb x, @(state+i) // x := state[i]
lb y, @(sbox+x) // y := sbox[x]
sb @(state+i), y // state[i] := y
add i, i, #(1)
bneq loop, i, #(16)
rtn
End
]#;
}
Execution times (in cycles), over
1000 runs:
min max average
reference 6385 6385 6385
code generator 5671 12910 9345
polymorphic instance 7185 9745 8303
Impact of the code generation
interval ω:
ω k %
1 2.76 53.0%
5 1.59 18.4%
20 1.37 2.1%
100 1.31 1.1%
k : overhead vs. reference implementation
%: percentage contribution of runtime code
generation to the performance overhead
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